Clark opens his critique with an introduction to Aquinas's argument. To begin with, I wish to note that of the Five Ways, he insists that "first four are almost identical, and the fifth is so little different, that only the first will be reproduced here." But this is not right. The first four of Aquinas's Ways may be similar in that they are (broadly speaking) cosmological arguments, but they are not "almost identical." One can give a mere cursory reading of Aquinas here to see that Clark is wrong. While it is true that most of his objections apply to the next three arguments just as well, it is simply not true that the lines of thought Aquinas uses are the same. The Fifth Way is also not similar to the other four arguments at all. How exactly does Clark think a broadly teleological argument from the final causes to which all things are driven is similar in ANY sense to an argument from change and motion? He does not tell us. I can only think that Clark does not understand Aquinas at all. Suffice it to say that he is badly mistaken on this point.
Clark goes on to quote Aquinas's statement of the argument in the Summa, and then to present his first objection. He basically insists that Aquinas, in stating that the fact of change is evident to our senses, presupposes empiricism, and that empiricism is an incorrect position, so the argument must be faulty. He proceeds to drivel on for a paragraph about how sense experience is untrustworthy. Clark's arguments against empiricism may be correct, but I am not interested to evaluate them. I am concerned only with whether his charge against Aquinas is viable. It is not. In fact, it is very easy to rephrase the Thomistic discourse to make it clear that Aquinas is not presupposing empiricism. The central thrust of this part of the argument is that things change; that is, that change is a real part of the world (viz., reality). That is all that needs to be true for the argument to get off the ground. And one does not, in fact, need to appeal to sense experience in order to justify that premise. It is indeed immediately obvious to every individual: one has direct experience of change when one transitions from one thought to another, from one sensation to another, from one experience of a stimulus to another. In fact, one has an experience of a sort of change just by existing (that is, the actualization of the potential of oneself to exist is change in the relevant sense). Empiricism does not need to be true in order for these facts to hold, and Clark falsely assumes the opposite. So, this objection fails.
Clark's second objection amounts to an assertion that Aquinas is probably wrong somewhere in the formulation of his argument. Clark (rightly) notes that the argument as it appears in the Summa is quite brief and that Aquinas gives a much more thorough discourse elsewhere (namely, in the Summa Contra Gentiles). He then goes on to say that Aquinas must have made a mistake somewhere in such detailed metaphysical exposition and that one such mistake would render the whole argument invalid. To begin with, this is unfair and begs the question, as Clark himself admits. It is not acceptable to glibly state that a complicated argument is probably wrong because it has a lot of premises. That is lazy and does not amount to much of a critique at all. If Clark wants to refute Aquinas, he actually needs to do it, instead of just insisting that it is probable that he could. I do not see much reason to suppose that Aquinas's argument is probably wrong anyway. He and many other subsequent philosophers and theologians spent much time and thought developing it, and it is very silly to insist that they all must've made some mistake somewhere. The argument is also not as complicated as Clark seems to think. To be sure, the "lengthy substantiation" that he demands HAS been provided by philosophers (e.g. Edward Feser, in the first chapter of his Five Proofs, forwards a broadly Aristotelian argument which Aquinas's own is essentially a variation of), and such substantiation does not need to cover hundreds of pages at all, but can rather be done in dozens. Clark greatly overstates the issue the Thomist faces on this point.
In trying to salvage the above objection, Clark turns to alleged circularity in Aristotle's definitions of potentiality and motion in book three of his Physics. I really do not understand how this relates to the point Clark is trying to make at all. How exactly is it relevant whether Aristotle's use of such terms is circular or not? Either way, the notions of "potentiality" and "change" (change is really what Aristotle and Aquinas have in mind when they say "motion") are intuitive and axiomatic enough, and commonsense definitions can readily be given for them which avoid circularity. Change is the reduction of a potential to an actual, and a potential is that which could be but is not. (Perhaps there are problems with these rather extempore definitions, but I am quite optimistic that they could be revised to avoid any issues that might arise regarding them.) So this objection also fails.
Clark's third objection involves an accusation that Aquinas is being circular. He declares that the whole point of the argument is to prove that there is a first cause (which is true), but that Aquinas uses the notion that there must be a first cause as one of his premises, which renders the whole argument invalid. But this is an exceedingly elementary and very easily countered charge. Does Clark really think that Aquinas would be so utterly foolish as to present an argument that is so manifestly erroneous? Luckily for Aquinas, a careful reading of the argument will reveal no circularity at all. The premises of the argument can be formulated thusly:
- Change is a real feature of the world.
- Whatever changes must be changed by something other than itself.
- If something is changed by something else, there results a regress of causality; but this regress cannot extend to infinity because this results in incoherence (N.B. Aquinas here has in mind what Duns Scotus termed an "essentially ordered series." Essentially ordered series are series in which intermediary members of the series possess causal power instrumentally as opposed to inherently. Think of a coffee cup held up by a table held up by a floor held up by the foundation of a house held up by the Earth. In that case, the power that the table has to suspend the coffee cup above the ground is derived from the floor, and the power the floor has to suspend the table—and therefore the cup—is derived from the foundation of the house, and so on. In this type of series, a first member is needed, or else the whole situation becomes incoherent. How does it make any sense to posit a suspended coffee cup if there is just, say, an infinite series of tables it hypothetically rests on? In such a situation it is senseless to suppose that the cup can be suspended at all.)
- Therefore, there must be a "first changer" which endows all the intermediary "changers" of our experience with the capacity to change other things.
As one can see, there is certainly no circularity in the argument when it is understood properly. Clark once again abuses Aquinas in grinding his proverbial axe in the face of reason itself. Again, his objection fails.
The fourth objection involves the Thomistic idea that God's essence is not distinct from his existence; namely, that God just is Subsistent Existence itself. Clark argues that this entails that we cannot attribute predicates to God in the same way we attribute them to anything else. For example, what it means for God to be good, or rational, or conscious, or whatever, is not the same as what it means for anything else to be good, rational, conscious, or whatever. But it follows (Clark says) that what it means for God to exist is not the same as what it means for rocks or humans or anything else to exist. So the argument in question starts with existence in a "worldly" sense and ends with existence in a "divine" sense, which is fallacious because the terms which appear in the premises are not those which appear in the conclusion. He concludes that the argument fails on this line of thought. Here Clark is attacking the formal validity of the argument: he is asserting that the conclusion does not follow from the premises and that the "syllogism is a fallacy." While this is a much more plausible objection than the prior ones, it still does not work.
To get at what is wrong with this, I first need to introduce some background principles. I have already briefly introduced the concept of analogical language: language in which terms are applied to subjects in different ways, but where the terms are still essentially related. Consider what it means when we say "this food is good," and that "John is a good man." Here the word "good" isn't used in exactly the same sense (this would be a univocal use of terms), or in totally different senses (this would be an equivocal use of terms), but rather in a related sense. This is analogical language. Now, there are two basic different types of analogy itself: there is analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality. In analogy of attribution, an attribute only exists intrinsically in a "primary" analogate, and is only attributed to "secondary" analogates by virtue of their relation to the primary analogate. An example: "Bob is healthy," and "lettuce is healthy food." Here Bob is the primary analogate because health exists intrinsically only in him, and lettuce is the secondary analogate because health only exists in lettuce insofar as it is the cause of health in things such as Bob.
The analogy of proportionality can itself be divided into two different types: analogy of proper proportionality and analogy of improper proportionality. In analogy of proper proportionality, terms are attributed to the analogates intrinsically and formally (i.e. by their natures). An example: humans, plants, and animals are all alive. Life exists intrinsically in all of these analogates, and it also exists formally in them (it is in the nature of them all to be alive), but the way in which they are each alive is clearly not exactly the same. Their being alive must be understood in the analogical sense of proper proportionality. Although life occurs in plants, animals, and humans in a different mode, it really is still life. Each of the analogates is alive, and the same sort of meaning is employed for what it means to be alive in each of the analogates. The analogy comes in when we get to the issue of how life exists in each of the different things. The analogy of improper proportionality, on the other hand, still involves terms which are attributed to the analogates intrinsically, but the terms do not apply literally or formally to each analogate. Consider how we might say of an animal scurrying across my floor: "that is a rat." But we might also say of a particularly disloyal person: "he is a rat." Now the latter analogate is obviously not by nature a rat; he is rather metaphorically or figuratively rattish. This is what distinguishes analogies of proper and improper proportionality.
It is analogy of proper proportionality that is indispensable to understanding how God must be compared to everything else. Clark is quite right that terms cannot be attributed univocally to God, as something that is completely simple and devoid of any potentiality, and therefore completely different from all other existing substances. The manner in which God exists (or acts, or moves, or whatever) is not exactly the same as the things of our experience which do the same. But being still resides in Him intrinsically, as in other things, and formally, as in other things. But because God does not exist in the same mode of being as these other things, we cannot use univocal language to refer to His existence. Indeed, God is so radically different from the things of our experience that it would be impossible to make ANY positive claims about Him or His nature if we did not utilize analogical language. (Note that we can still use univocal language in a limited sense to speak about what God is NOT. This is called "apophatic" or negative theology.)
Now we can understand what is wrong with Clark's objection: it is true that God does not exist in the same way that myself or anything else does, but this does not mean that the conclusion of the argument employs terms that do not appear in the premises. (In fact, the whole argument could be seen as demonstrating an analogy of attribution, where the things of the world are secondary analogates which receive their existence from God, the primary analogate in whom alone existence intrinsically IS.) Clark insists that it is fallacious to argue this way because "the verb to be does not have the same meaning" with regard to God and all else. But this is not a good way of putting the issue. It is true that when we say that "the world (or whatever) is" we don't mean "is" in exactly the same sense as when we say that "God is." But the term is still the same, and the meanings are still closely related. The changing things of our experience really are. And it is precisely because they really are that there must be something which changes them that itself does not change. If this first mover cannot be said to exist in the same sense that anything else does, fine. There is indeed an analogy of proper proportionality involved in what we are saying here, but this simply does not entail the failure of the argument, because the analogy is built into the argument, as it were. (It is also important to note that the notions of essence/existence, divine simplicity, and so on are not included in the premises of the argument. Whether the First Mover's existence is identical to its essence is rather irrelevant to whether there is a First Mover in the first place, and the latter question alone is what the argument intends to answer.) So, contra Clark, the argument employs no fallacy because it is structured around the idea that existence in the abovementioned "wordly" sense entails existence in the "divine" sense. We are not beginning with existence understood one way and then suddenly switching our understanding of the term upon reaching the conclusion of the argument. The intent is to show that because there are wordly existences, there must be some sort of divine existence. Clark fails to appreciate what the argument is really saying, the structure of it, and its use of terms. As with the other objections, this one fails.
To get at what is wrong with this, I first need to introduce some background principles. I have already briefly introduced the concept of analogical language: language in which terms are applied to subjects in different ways, but where the terms are still essentially related. Consider what it means when we say "this food is good," and that "John is a good man." Here the word "good" isn't used in exactly the same sense (this would be a univocal use of terms), or in totally different senses (this would be an equivocal use of terms), but rather in a related sense. This is analogical language. Now, there are two basic different types of analogy itself: there is analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality. In analogy of attribution, an attribute only exists intrinsically in a "primary" analogate, and is only attributed to "secondary" analogates by virtue of their relation to the primary analogate. An example: "Bob is healthy," and "lettuce is healthy food." Here Bob is the primary analogate because health exists intrinsically only in him, and lettuce is the secondary analogate because health only exists in lettuce insofar as it is the cause of health in things such as Bob.
The analogy of proportionality can itself be divided into two different types: analogy of proper proportionality and analogy of improper proportionality. In analogy of proper proportionality, terms are attributed to the analogates intrinsically and formally (i.e. by their natures). An example: humans, plants, and animals are all alive. Life exists intrinsically in all of these analogates, and it also exists formally in them (it is in the nature of them all to be alive), but the way in which they are each alive is clearly not exactly the same. Their being alive must be understood in the analogical sense of proper proportionality. Although life occurs in plants, animals, and humans in a different mode, it really is still life. Each of the analogates is alive, and the same sort of meaning is employed for what it means to be alive in each of the analogates. The analogy comes in when we get to the issue of how life exists in each of the different things. The analogy of improper proportionality, on the other hand, still involves terms which are attributed to the analogates intrinsically, but the terms do not apply literally or formally to each analogate. Consider how we might say of an animal scurrying across my floor: "that is a rat." But we might also say of a particularly disloyal person: "he is a rat." Now the latter analogate is obviously not by nature a rat; he is rather metaphorically or figuratively rattish. This is what distinguishes analogies of proper and improper proportionality.
It is analogy of proper proportionality that is indispensable to understanding how God must be compared to everything else. Clark is quite right that terms cannot be attributed univocally to God, as something that is completely simple and devoid of any potentiality, and therefore completely different from all other existing substances. The manner in which God exists (or acts, or moves, or whatever) is not exactly the same as the things of our experience which do the same. But being still resides in Him intrinsically, as in other things, and formally, as in other things. But because God does not exist in the same mode of being as these other things, we cannot use univocal language to refer to His existence. Indeed, God is so radically different from the things of our experience that it would be impossible to make ANY positive claims about Him or His nature if we did not utilize analogical language. (Note that we can still use univocal language in a limited sense to speak about what God is NOT. This is called "apophatic" or negative theology.)
Now we can understand what is wrong with Clark's objection: it is true that God does not exist in the same way that myself or anything else does, but this does not mean that the conclusion of the argument employs terms that do not appear in the premises. (In fact, the whole argument could be seen as demonstrating an analogy of attribution, where the things of the world are secondary analogates which receive their existence from God, the primary analogate in whom alone existence intrinsically IS.) Clark insists that it is fallacious to argue this way because "the verb to be does not have the same meaning" with regard to God and all else. But this is not a good way of putting the issue. It is true that when we say that "the world (or whatever) is" we don't mean "is" in exactly the same sense as when we say that "God is." But the term is still the same, and the meanings are still closely related. The changing things of our experience really are. And it is precisely because they really are that there must be something which changes them that itself does not change. If this first mover cannot be said to exist in the same sense that anything else does, fine. There is indeed an analogy of proper proportionality involved in what we are saying here, but this simply does not entail the failure of the argument, because the analogy is built into the argument, as it were. (It is also important to note that the notions of essence/existence, divine simplicity, and so on are not included in the premises of the argument. Whether the First Mover's existence is identical to its essence is rather irrelevant to whether there is a First Mover in the first place, and the latter question alone is what the argument intends to answer.) So, contra Clark, the argument employs no fallacy because it is structured around the idea that existence in the abovementioned "wordly" sense entails existence in the "divine" sense. We are not beginning with existence understood one way and then suddenly switching our understanding of the term upon reaching the conclusion of the argument. The intent is to show that because there are wordly existences, there must be some sort of divine existence. Clark fails to appreciate what the argument is really saying, the structure of it, and its use of terms. As with the other objections, this one fails.
This is a difficult and complex subject, and I hope the reader will forgive me for employing such dense discourse. I hope I have at least convincingly shown that Clark's objection with regard to essence/existence is severely mistaken, and does not pose any difficulty for the Thomistic argument.
Clark's final objection is a standard one often levied against natural theology in general. He insists that Aquinas is wrong when he says that the First Mover arrived at by his argument "everyone understands to be God." Clark holds that God as proved by the argument is "not satisfactory" for the Christian Trinitarian conception of God. He then goes on to assert that if the argument were valid, Christianity would be false, and that "no form of the cosmological argument has ever claimed to demonstrate the existence of this only true God." Clark is right that the argument does not prove Christian theism. It does not prove the existence of the Trinitarian God who sent prophets to ancient Israel, or who became incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ to save the world from sin. Nor is it intended to. Rather, the argument is intended to show that there must be an unmoved mover, an unactualized actualizer, a first cause of all of the things in the world that exist. And this it does. Furthermore, Clark's assertion to the effect that Christianity would be false if the argument were true only has force if the God proved by the argument were incompatible with the God represented in the Christian Scriptures. But there is absolutely no reason to suppose that this is the case, and Clark doesn't really offer any argument that there is. The chief attributes of God as described in the Bible are immateriality (Jn. 4:24), immutability (Mal. 3:6, Jms. 1:17), eternality/infinity (Ps. 90:2, Deut. 33:27), perfect goodness (Mt. 5:48), omnipotence (Job 42:2), and omniscience (1 Jn. 3:20). Does the God proved by the argument necessarily fail to possess any of these attributes? I think not. And what follows is that the God of the First Way is entirely compatible with the God of Christianity. In fact, Thomist philosopher Edward Feser has argued in his Five Proofs that the God proved by the argument must possess all of these attributes, and many of the others which are traditionally ascribed to the Christian God (see pp. 29-34). I will not endeavor to reproduce Feser's arguments here, as they are somewhat lengthy and unnecessary to forward for my present task, but I direct interested readers to study his book and evaluate his thinking for themselves. In any case, as I have just shown, Clark is completely wrong in arguing that Christianity must be false if the argument in question were valid. Indeed, those who accept Aquinas's philosophical system are nearly invariably Christians. Just because the existence of the "only true [Christian] God" is not specifically demonstrated by the argument does not mean that it is a bad argument, or that it is useless, or that the God that it proves the existence of is not, in actuality, the Christian God. Clark's final objection, like all of the others, fails.
Clark closes his discourse with some criticism of Cornelius Van Til's somewhat positive attitude towards the cosmological argument. I am not interested in the intra-presuppositionalist debate between Van Til and Clark, so I will ignore what he says on this matter. He further states that the assertion that the cosmological argument is "valid, absolutely sound, a formal demonstration, and not merely a probability argument does not hold true of any cosmological argument published in any book." Really? And how does Clark know this? Has he studied and thoroughly evaluated every cosmological argument every theist has ever formulated and defended? Or perhaps God Himself has descended from heaven and revealed this to him? Clark does not say, but if the objections he presents in his article are any indication as to his understanding of cosmological arguments, this just amounts to another bald assertion, one he is compelled to make by his own ridiculous and baseless ideological bias against natural theology. He demonstrates himself to be no better, or perhaps even worse than many atheists on this matter.
It is truly unfortunate that a mind as sharp and devoted as Gordon Clark was so scornful of an argument which has solidified the faith of so many of his fellow Christians over the past eight hundred years. I hope that I have at least shown the reader that none of Clark's criticisms work, and that he utterly fails to elucidate any fallacies which might be embedded in Thomas Aquinas. Whether there are any such fallacies is, of course, a different question, and a controversial one at that. But Clark casts no light on the matter either way.
"There are surely hundreds or even thousands of philosophers who think Aquinas is guilty of various fallacies because they simply don’t understand what his arguments are really about," says Edward Feser. If only Clark managed to avoid the applicability of this charge.
It is truly unfortunate that a mind as sharp and devoted as Gordon Clark was so scornful of an argument which has solidified the faith of so many of his fellow Christians over the past eight hundred years. I hope that I have at least shown the reader that none of Clark's criticisms work, and that he utterly fails to elucidate any fallacies which might be embedded in Thomas Aquinas. Whether there are any such fallacies is, of course, a different question, and a controversial one at that. But Clark casts no light on the matter either way.
"There are surely hundreds or even thousands of philosophers who think Aquinas is guilty of various fallacies because they simply don’t understand what his arguments are really about," says Edward Feser. If only Clark managed to avoid the applicability of this charge.
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