OLD TESTAMENT
Hodge begins the second part of his book with an overview of Genesis. He notes that the Atrahasis epic parallels many of the themes of Genesis (creation, the emergence of an evil related to human activity, a great flood, a hero who saves a remnant of humanity through constructing a boat, and a final moral given about humanity following the flood's resolution). He argues that the Genesis creation account was likely intended to rebut the "pro-contraceptive" argument that the Atrahasis epic sets forth. This Genesis was intended as a response to narratives like Atrahasis may very well be true. Various Mesopotamian stories such as the Epic of Gilgamesh and the Sumerian flood myths were probably known to the author(s) of Genesis. But regardless, Hodge makes a few mistakes regarding the Atrahasis epic which I will briefly address before moving on to the Biblical material. (The reader can peruse a translation of the entire Atrahasis epic for themselves here.)
First, Hodge states (p. 54) that in the Atrahasis story, evil comes into the world through human overpopulation. But this is not the case; it is not evil that comes into the world via humans, it is noise. Disturbance, cacophony, and clamor. The gods do not like this, so they decide to destroy humanity in order to restore the previous quietude. Second, Hodge argues that in the Atrahasis story, "a warning is given after the flood that women should use contraceptive methods in order to limit their children or a she-demon would cause miscarriages." This is intended as an "effort to scare people from having too many children." (p. 54) But this is not quite what the narrative says. On the contrary, the gods, wanting to keep the human population in check, invent celibate religious orders in addition to creating the pasittu (she-demon), who was to be responsible for infant mortality. A divine program of birth control is indeed established here. But it apparently involved less of an attempt to "scare" women away from childbearing and with more an attempt to explain the natural order of things. The Atrahasis epic endeavors to provide justification and elucidation of deeper meaning inherent to the horrors of human experience, as Joshua Mark points out in his brief essay on the epic. It is therefore incorrect, or at the very least unverifiable, that the Atrahasis epic intended to provide some sort of argument to the effect that women ought to use contraception or else. Hodge mischaracterizes the purpose of the account.
Now we move on to considering the first several chapters of Genesis, particularly as God's creative intent unfolds through the making of humanity, and God's plan for how the earth would be populated.
We start with the Genesis 1 creation account: the universe is formless and void, and is, as such, uninhabitable. Because of this, God furnishes it with light, matter, plant and animal life, and various divisions, which make the earth inhabitable for humans. This is all well and good, but Hodge's talk of humans' status as "representatives" of God's rule over Earth is not expressed in the text. Nor is the idea that the "uninhabitable" earth is a "threat" to God's purpose of filling the world with his creations. The text merely states that God, desiring (for whatever reason) to establish humanity, saw fit to order the hitherto unformed (or "void") earth such that living creatures could inhabit it. God could just as well have created creatures who were capable of living in a void, or he could have abstained from creating humans entirely. There are no "threats" to God's purposes either way.
Hodge begins to forward his position more with respect to the Genesis 2 text. Much of what is at issue here seems to stem over the nature of Adam's being "alone" (the Hebrew word, bad, often indicates separation). Adam is by himself. Hodge argues that God creates him a female who functions as his "helper" in the realm of procreation. Eve assists Adam with the goal of populating the earth. Hodge goes on to argue that the "one flesh" notion in verse 24 refers to the conception of a child (see p. 56 and footnote 7). The man leaves his parents, is joined to his wife, and the two "become" one flesh insofar as they produce that which is a combination of material from both of them. Hodge argues that this is what is meant by the Genesis text in referring to the "one flesh," and that Christ's Matthew 19:5 identification of it with the marital union merely "fills out the doctrine nicely."
There are a number of oversights with Hodge's entire analysis here. To begin with, the context of Adam being alone and requiring a "helper" does not restrict our interpretation to procreative concerns, nor does it at all imply that the primary purpose of sex is procreation. Obviously, procreation is a major reason for God's provision of Eve (as per Gen. 1:28 and 2:24), but there is no textual reason to insist that it is the main or primary reason. The text simply does not illustrate any specific reason as to what God intends Eve to help Adam with. In all likelihood, there were a plethora of functions Eve could serve relative to that capacity: she could help Adam emotionally, intellectually, personally, and even physically. The context of the entire account, verses 1:28 and 2:24 notwithstanding, do not defeat these as legitimate ends of God's creating Eve, who was created such as to be suitable, or "corresponding to," Adam. As Calvin notes in his commentary on Genesis, this correspondence (Hbr. נֶגֶד) "intimate[s] that marriage extends to all parts and usages of life," and that "hence is refitted the error of some, who think that the woman was formed only for the sake of propagation, and who restrict the word 'good,' which had been lately mentioned, to the production of offspring. They do not think that a wife was personally necessary for Adam, because he was hitherto free from lust; as if she had been given to him only for the companion of his chamber, and not rather that she might be the inseparable associate of his life." Accordingly, it is quite senseless to insist, as Hodge does, that the correspondence in question indicates a mere biological and genital one, and that Adam's being alone was simply a threat to God's desire to populate the earth. For why could not God endow Adam with the capacity to reproduce asexually? This would certainly allay many issues regarding lust, marital fidelity, and the possibility of sin in the realm of procreation. If God's only goal in this matter was the population of the earth, it seems asexually reproducing creatures would be the ideal ones to make in His image. God's institution of marriage only makes sense if marriage was instituted for additional reasons that just procreation.
Furthermore, interpreting the "one flesh" phrase employed in Genesis as referring to childbearing is fraught with problems. To begin with, note that this passage is one of the few in the Old Testament that is exposited in the New, not only by Christ Himself but also by St. Paul. Both Christ and Paul identify the "one flesh" with the marital union itself, not the product of that union. No mention of childbearing is made at all (see Matthew 19:3-9 and 1 Cor. 6:15-16). Lest my reader assume that I am presenting a false dilemma here, it must be first stressed that these are two separate interpretive paradigms. If we are to admit that the "one flesh" refers to a child, it must then have a double meaning, such that the phrase encompasses both the marital union and the product of that union at the same time. It is my contention, however, that the "one flesh" cannot refer to both of these things at the same time. The text clearly intends only one of these meanings, and the latter one at that.
To see this, let us first look at verse 23, where Adam speaks of Eve as the bone of his bones and the flesh of his flesh. The next verse explicitly notes that for this reason a man shall leave his parents and cleave to his wife, and become one flesh with her. So, it was precisely because Eve was the flesh of Adam's flesh and the bone of his bones that he became joined to her in marriage. This does not make any sense if the "one flesh" is referring to a child. For this "flesh of flesh" idea does not merely connote some sort of genital correspondence, but a deeper sort of being-in-relationship (compare Gen. 29:14, Judges 9:2, 2 Sam. 5:1, and 2 Sam. 19:13, where this sort of language is used to designate relationship). In addition, such language is never used in Scripture to refer to sexual activity or conception. In Hebrew, the terms יָדַע and הָרָה are used, respectively, to refer to sex (euphemistically) and pregnancy. It follows from this that the Genesis 2:24 text must be understood to indicate a sort of being-in-relationship, not procreation. There is no textual indication that children are what is meant by the "one flesh" concept. We may even go further and argue that it is impossible for the text to be indicating this, for it would then be guilty of inaccuracy. Man and woman do not "become one flesh" in conceiving a child, but rather the sperm and egg do. Nor can synecdoche be at play here, for verse 23 speaks of the husband and wife as actual persons, not sperms and eggs (such use of synecdoche would be extremely awkward anyway; it seems undignified to refer to gametes as human beings). So from all of the above considerations, it may be safely concluded that the Genesis passage in question does not imply childbearing, and therefore does not indicate that having children is an obligation married couples are bound to.
Finally, Hodge argues in the footnote on page 57 that God could not have established marriage for companionship reasons because God is all-sufficient as a cure for loneliness, and because there will not be marriage in heaven. This argument is obviously wrong because it fails to take into account what God's act of creating Eve for Adam in a companionate sense actually means. The fact of the matter is that God created humans as relational creatures. This is clear from experience alone but is also implied by the Genesis 2 text as well. Contra Hodge, Adam's being alone specifies no "separation" from anything, simply because there was nothing for Adam to be separated from. Adam hadn't any descendants or relatives from whom he could even in principle be sequestered. The point is just what the text says: that Adam was by himself and that this was not good because God did not create Adam to live by himself. He created him to live in relationship with others, particularly in marital relationship with a wife. To maintain that God must be all-sufficient to deal with man's loneliness is like insisting that God must be all-sufficient to deal with man's hunger and thirst. Matthew 4:4 notwithstanding, man does need actual food and drink to live. It is no contradiction to God's sovereignty or sufficiency that He is not materially adequate to satisfy my desire for bread and water, because humanity was created such that it requires more than merely God to survive. In the same manner, humanity was created such that it requires more than merely God to be emotionally and relationally fulfilled. That there will not be sexuality in the hereafter poses no challenge to this basic fact either. God created humans to be in community with each other; this was His intention before, during, and after the Fall into sin, and this basic fact is evidenced by the essential nature of humanity itself. Consequently, the passages Hodge appeals to in support of his view (namely 1:28, 2:24, and 4:1) do not cohere in the way that they would need to in order for his interpretation to be viable. There is no justification for his approach to the verses.
Next, Hodge engages in a brief discussion of Genesis 3, 4, and 5 before moving on to give an overview of the rest of the Book. There is, of course, nothing of note in these two chapters that supports his position, but there indeed are some interesting passages in chapters 4 and 5 which I would like to draw my reader's attention to. At the beginning of chapter 4 Adam is spoken of as "knowing" his wife for the first time, and she thereby conceives Cain and Abel. Following the violent debacle between the two brothers, Adam "knows" Eve again in verse 25 and she conceives Seth, who is "appointed" as "another seed" for Adam in replacement of Abel. Next, in chapter 5 the family of Adam is further expounded upon in addition to the length of Adam's life and of those who succeed him. Verses 3-4 in particular note that Adam lived 130 years before having Seth, and that he lived 800 years after begetting him, in which years he had other sons and daughters. Of note is the very long gap of time between Adam's begetting Cain and Abel and his begetting of Seth. An interesting question arises: why did it take so long for Adam to produce more offspring following Cain and Abel? The gap between 4:1-2 and 4:25 is greater than a century. How was this managed given the lack of reliable contraception? These are intriguing questions, but ones I shall not seek to answer here. I will leave them to my reader to ponder, and merely note how unexpected these passages are given the strictly normative account of procreation that Hodge subscribes to.
Next, an overview of Genesis 6-10 is given. Here the corruption of mankind culminating in the Flood is covered, along with the subsequent covenant made with Noah and the account of his descendants. Hodge continues to insist on his theme of "threats" to God's filling up the earth with humans, and the purpose of Genesis as a polemic against the "pro-birth control propaganda" of the Atrahasis epic. He argues that verses 1-4 of chapter 6 indicate another supposed threat to God's plans. This is indeed plausible given the apparent connotations of the passage (impure marriages are occurring), but it is far from clear that this is intended as some sort of polemic against Atrahasis.
Hodge also notes the connection between the "corruption" of the earth and God's rationale for sending the Flood. However, his contention that the word "corrupt" (6:11; שָׁחַת) indicates only individual sexual sins or the punishment of such sins is completely wrong. The term actually designates general destruction, decay, or spoiling, whether it be moral or physical. There is no suggestion in the passages dealing with Sodom and Gomorrah or Onan's sin that the corruption taking place merely involves the "distorting [of] the purpose of the sexual act, where the sexual activity performed threatens the procreative purpose God designed for it." Let the reader review Genesis 18 and 13:13. There is no implication that the exceeding wickedness of Sodom and Gomorrah were of an exclusively sexual nature. Likewise, Onan's act of "wasting" his seed upon the ground (38:9) was not immoral because of any distortion or corruption of God's will with respect to the sexual act, but rather because Onan was rebelling against his father, dishonoring his late brother, and cruelly depriving his wife of a lineage (this passage will be discussed further below). In virtue of these facts, it is highly questionable to attribute the corruption of the earth in question to simple sexual perversion, let alone non-procreative sexual perversion. Hodge again foists his anti-contraceptive presuppositions onto the text.
He then moves on to discuss the Tower of Babel story in Genesis 11, noting the attempt by humanity to usurp divine prerogative in gathering together and asserting their own power over and against God's. Naturally, Hodge wants to take the presumptuous action of the humans involved and extend it into some sort of anti-procreative rebellion against God's will. He asserts that there is a connection
between God's statement to the effect that nothing would be withheld from the humans given their unity, and the "power of divinity over childbirth." However, this is obviously not true. There is no such connection identifiable here; the passage is merely concerned with the arrogant pride of those seeking to erect their name in substitution of God's. Neither is there any reason to conclude that God's statement likely refers to urban overpopulation and subsequent attempts to control childbirth, as Hodge suggests. It must be remembered that the Genesis account is not a simple critical commentary on the Atrahasis epic or other ancient Mesopotamian creation myths; it is, on the contrary, a full and positive account in its own right. It is foolish to approach every nook and cranny of Genesis as though it were an argument against Babylonian legends.
It is also noteworthy that Hodge seems to think that the Atrahasis epic endorses the congregation of people in one place as opposed to their spreading out and filling the earth. I am honestly at a loss as to where he is getting this idea. Perhaps I am missing something, but I can find no passage in the entire epic which implies this. The reader is encouraged to peruse the translation of the epic that I have linked above and look for themselves.
Hodge wraps up his treatment of Genesis by transitioning into an overview of the rest of the book, culminating with the story of Onan in chapter 38. I shall briefly address his comments on the narrative leading up to chapter 38 before discussing the relevant parts of that chapter itself. Insofar as it is the only place in Scripture where contraception is ever mentioned directly, I consider this passage the most important plank of Hodge's case. If his point cannot be proved from it, I contend that his entire Biblical argument must fail.
Hodge continues his polemic by highlighting the figures of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and his wives. He argues that both Abraham and Isaac treat procreation as a primarily human endeavor when they attempt to bring about God's purposes by means of their own actions, and spurn God's capabilities (e.g. Abraham's sexual liaison with Hagar, Sarah's laughing at God for suggesting that she will conceive in her old age, Isaac lying to Abimelech's men that his wife is actually his sister, etc.). He notes the narrative attribution of procreation to God's action throughout chapters 29 and 30 in the story of Leah's giving birth to many children where she had been barren before, in addition to the children borne by the handmaids of both Leah and Rachel.
I am perfectly willing to acknowledge that God is as much involved in the conception of children as humans are, if not more. However, it does not follow from this fact that "God should be the one who both brings about the creation of children without the interference of men by opening the womb as He sees fit and chooses to prevent their creation by closing the womb." This is a non sequitur: the fact that procreative action involved God in all of the aforementioned passages is certainly indicative of God's sovereignty and power over the realm of childbearing, but we cannot take this to mean that human initiative to prevent (or facilitate) conception is immoral. Furthermore, Hodge continues to insist on God's "procreative purposes" of filling up the earth with His "covenant children." I do not see any reason to interpret any of the events Hodge lists as principally inhibiting God's plan in the realm of filling up the earth. How exactly does the dislocation of Jacob's thigh in Genesis 32 inhibit God's plans in any meaningful way? Why is the danger posed to Jacob by Esau significant chiefly because it presents a threat to the population of the planet? And how can Dinah's rape in chapter 34 be construed simply as a menace to the perpetuation of "covenant children"? Indeed, in the latter case, the main issue was that Dinah had been treated as a harlot (see vv. 5, 7, 13, 27, and 31).
It is also interesting to note how the barrenness of Leah and Rachel is treated in the text as God's doing. If sexuality is as Hodge seems to think it is, such that the primary (if not the only) purpose of sex is procreation, why would God "close the wombs" of Jacob's wives? If procreation carried all the normative moral significance that Hodge wants it to, why would God act to prevent the creation of children? This divine action is highly contraceptive, and while it might still be objected that human contraceptive action is wrong because it somehow usurps prerogative that belongs rightfully to God, it cannot be held that this action is wrong because it inhibits God's "purposes." Clearly, God's purposes are not such that preventing conception is always immoral; there are numerous places in Scripture where God takes contraceptive action, either explicitly or implicitly (cf. the present passage with Genesis 11, 20, and 25, 1 Samuel 1, Judges 13, and Luke 1). This directly contradicts Hodge's polemic that any and all forms of contraception are evil, and presents an interesting challenge to the claims of his book. In any case, I will leave this issue to the reader's deliberation, and move on to a consideration of Genesis 38.
We finally come to one of the foremost texts around which the contraception debate in Christendom revolves. The relevant passage is in reality quite short, only encompassing five verses (38:6-10). As I mentioned above, its significance lies in the fact that it is the only place in all of Scripture in which contraceptive action is directly addressed, albeit briefly. Hodge presents his argument with respect to it in the form of seven points which he ostensibly takes to prove the passage's condemnation of contraception simpliciter. I will respond to each of his points sequentially and show his contentions to be completely baseless, but first I will provide a quick summary of the passage and what I take to be the correct approach to it. The reader is advised to follow along in his own Bible. The text reads as follows (as per the NASB translation):
6 Now Judah took a wife for Er his firstborn, and her name was Tamar. 7 But Er, Judah’s firstborn, was evil in the sight of the Lord, so the Lord took his life. 8 Then Judah said to Onan, “Go in to your brother’s wife, and perform your duty as a brother-in-law to her, and raise up offspring for your brother.” 9 Onan knew that the offspring would not be his; so when he went in to his brother’s wife, he wasted his seed on the ground in order not to give offspring to his brother. 10 But what he did was displeasing in the sight of the Lord; so He took his life also.The passage here immediately succeeds Judah's taking a Canaanite wife and having several children with her. As the passage states, Judah finds a wife for his firstborn son Er, but he is killed by God due to his evil character. Desiring to secure his daughter-in-law's status (widows were an especially vulnerable class of people in ancient Israel, both economically and socially), Judah commands his secondborn son Onan to marry Tamar and raise up offspring (literally "seed") for the sake of his brother. Onan presumably agrees to do this (the act of "going in" to his brother's wife presupposes that he has married her), but instead of allowing conception to occur naturally, Onan practices coitus interruptus and emits onto the ground in an attempt not to give offspring to his brother. He does this because he does not want children that are not his. It is this action that God finds displeasing, and for which He takes Onan's life.
Now, it is vital to note the surrounding context of Onan's action. It is this context that makes it clear, in my view, that Onan's sin is not simply the act of contracepting. In other words, what is at issue is not whether Onan's contraceptive act was wrong, it is why Onan's contraceptive act was wrong. Hodge must argue that it was wrong because it frustrated God's "purposes in the sexual act." I shall argue that it was wrong because Onan disobeyed his father, dishonored his brother's lineage, and disgraced his wife, and ultimately sinned against God in doing all of these things. With this basic approach in place, I will deal with each of Hodges' points sequentially.
1. Death is not the penalty for breaking the levirate marriage law as per Deuteronomy 25:5-10.The legal penalty in Deuteronomy 25:5-10 concerns one who refuses to take his brother's wife in marriage at all. The shame ritual would not apply to Onan because he agreed to marry Tamar; his sin was not refusing to marry her but refusing to give her children. In addition, the sin of Onan is not merely that he is breaking any specific laws but that he is rebelling against his father and spurning his brother and new wife.
2. God is portrayed as more lenient in Genesis due to the lack of revelation at that time. Whatever we say Onan's sin is, it must be greivous enough to warrant God's execution of him.This is quite true, but it fails to establish that Onan's sin was fundamentally contraceptive.
3. The text states that the evil Onan performed was what he did, not what he failed to do. What he did was perform coitus interruptus, and therefore purposely distort the use of the sexual act instead of using it for God's purpose of making a child.The text does indeed state that Onan's sin was performing coitus interruptus. However, what the text does not state is that this was sinful because it "distorted the use of the sexual act." As I have argued above, the purposes of marriage and of the sexual act cannot reasonably be restricted to mere procreation, such that inhibiting those purposes becomes an act against God's will. We simply have no reason to believe that God wills the creation of a child or even the possibility of the creation of a child as a result of all sexual acts (or even of all marriages). To assume otherwise is to read one's own presuppositions into the text. Onan's sin needn't be understood as a simple failure to embrace the procreative purpose of sex.
4. The texual description of Onan's sin is so explicit and crass that the main focus of the passage is on his action of spilling his semen. Given that this act is described in such great detail (which detail is reserved in the Bible for describing sexually abhorent actions), it is unlikely that the act is not the explicit sin committed.Again, this is quite true, but besides the point. Onan's act of coitus interruptus is indeed the sin for which he is condemned, but it does not follow from this that coitus interruptus (or contraceptive action in general) is bad in itself.
5. Although levirate marriage plays a role here, the larger context proves that the real reason Onan was put to death was because God viewed his action as a rebellious and non-procreative use of the sexual act. To suggest otherwise is to both take the passage out of the context of Genesis as a whole and to set up a false dichotomy where the sin is either breaking levirate marriage law or committing sexual sin.To begin with, this argument assumes that the context of Genesis establishes the basic immorality of contraception. I have argued throughout this entire paper that it does not and that Hodge's arguments to the contrary uniformly fail. This point, therefore, does not provide any further evidence in favor of an anti-contraceptive agenda. Furthermore, it is not a false dichotomy to hold that Onan was apparently put to death only for his acts of rebellion and dishonor as opposed to the specific "sin" of non-procreative sexual action. The fact of the matter is that we DO have grounds for affirming the former; those reasons are explicitly spelled out in the text and referred to as immoral in other places of Scripture. We do NOT, on the other hand, have grounds for affirming the latter; it is not explicitly spelled out in the text and as I have been arguing, there is no other Scriptural basis for condemning "non-productive sexual acts" in general as sinful. While it is true that the text allows for Onan's sin to involve non-productive sexual action, if we have no reason to believe that such action is actually sinful, we cannot argue that this was part of Onan's error.
6. To suggest that the issue in question is simply about Onan wiping out the life of a child before it is made for his brother or extinguishing the existence of a child before it is made alone, misses the point. Everyone agrees that Onan's sin was an act that prevented conception. Therefore, the sin is using the sexual act in a way that prevents a covenant child from beginning to live. For what purpose the child is being brought into the world is irrelevant.The issue in question is not about Onan preventing a child from coming into being. (Indeed, as I have argued in the previous part of this refutation, it does not make any sense to speak of "extinguishing" the life of that which does not exist. A potential child is not an actual child.) The issue in question is what Onan's sin consists of. Does it consist of using the sexual act in a way that prevents a "covenant child" from beginning to live? Or does it consist of disobedience to parents, dishonor of levirate marriage (and therefore of Onan's brother and new wife), and lust on Onan's part? If Hodge wants to argue the former, he must present reasoning on his behalf. It is, of course, true that coitus interruptus involves the prevention of conception of a "covenant child," and that in this situation, that was sinful. However, it cannot be concluded from its sinfulness in this particular situation that it is sinful in all or most situations. The sinfulness of the action was derivative; it was evil not in itself, but because of the factors cited above.
7. In regard to point six, there is an inherent connection between the levirate law and the correct, procreative use of the sexual act; the two should not be distinguished so broadly. Onan could have refused to perform his levirate duty without having sex with Tamar, but instead he took part in an unproductive sexual act and refused to let it bring forth a child in the process. [Hodge goes on to quote Wenham in his Word Biblical Commentary on Genesis, where Wenham attempts to connect Er and Onan's sin by noting their "completely similar sentence and fate." Hodge contends that this, if true, would become an argument against labelling Onan's sin as anything other than coitus interrputus, since Er is not said to committ any of the egregious errors which can be attributed to Onan (i.e. the aforementioned disobedience, dishonor, and rebellion).]It is highly question-begging to assert that the "correct" use of the sexual act is procreative and that there is an inherent connection between levirate marriage and this "correct" use. On the contrary, the levirate laws the Hebrews followed were designed to protect widows, to maintain family lines, and to facilitate the endogamous marital practices the Israelites were bound to (i.e. they could not marry non-Hebrews). While I am inclined to agree that the levirate law should not be understood as completely severed from sexual morality, it is incorrect to approach it as though sexual morality was the main or only motivation behind establishing such laws. The actual motivations were the financial and social protection of widowed women and the preservation of wealth within the patrilineal family. In addition, I contend that Wenham's suggestion that the wickedness of Er and Onan are connected is tenuous at best. As anyone who reads the Old Testament will recognize, God's application of the death penalty can be quite liberal; one may be put to death for disobeying one's parents (Deuteronomy 21:18-21), collecting wood on the Sabbath (Numbers 15:32-36), offering the wrong type of incense to God (Leviticus 10:1-2), or even for an ostensibly well-meaning attempt to prevent the Ark of the Covenant from toppling over (2 Samuel 6:6-7). It is therefore plausible that Er could have committed any number of sins against God which resulted in his death; indeed, the text does not attribute Er's death to any specific sin he commits but rather to the disposition of his character (cf. v. 7 to v. 10). Given this, the fact that Onan receives the same "sentence and fate" as Er hardly demonstrates that their respective offenses are similar.
This has been a rather lengthy discussion of the relevant passage, but I hope the reader appreciates its significance with respect to the issues at hand, as well as the weakness of the arguments Hodge brings to the table. We quite simply have no reason to jump to the conclusion that Onan's sin is fundamentally contraceptive, while we do have reason to suppose that it involves social and filial dimensions. On this note, I will leave my discussion on the matter with this, and move on to the last Old Testament passage we will be looking at: Leviticus 18.
Leviticus 18 enumerates various laws governing Jewish sexual morality, and it is not surprising that this text is selected by Hodge for comment. While no one is arguing that this particular piece of Levitical law exhausts the code of sexual conduct the Jews considered themselves bound to, it would still be unexpected to find no condemnation of contraceptive practice there whatsoever if such practice is truly and seriously immoral.
Hodge begins with a quotation of verses 1-5, which read as follows:
He asserts that "viewing sexuality above and beyond the aspects of pleasure and intimacy is countercultural," and that the Ancient Near Eastern peoples who populated the world that surrounded the Hebrews saw the sexual act's purpose was that of pleasure, intimacy, AND procreation, only one of which was necessary to seek through the act (a view I hold to be quite correct). He further argues that this position has been held by most of Western civilization throughout the centuries, excepting only "devoted adherents" of Abrahamic religions.1 Then the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, 2 “Speak to the sons of Israel and say to them, ‘I am the Lord your God. 3 You shall not do what is done in the land of Egypt where you lived, nor are you to do what is done in the land of Canaan where I am bringing you; you shall not walk in their statutes. 4 You are to perform My judgments and keep My statutes, to live in accord with them; I am the Lord your God. 5 So you shall keep My statutes and My judgments, by which a man may live if he does them; I am the Lord.
This is not exactly true: Islam and Judaism have not historically taken as hardline a position on contraception as Christianity has. Hodge tries to blunt the force of this objection with respect to Judaism by pointing to the late composition of the relevant Talmudic texts (like Yevamot 12b; see the footnote on p. 73), but this ignores the fact that the content of those texts was not invented during the time at which the texts were written. The traditions contained in the Talmud stretch further back, and the rabbinic opinions cited therein are often principled by antecedent considerations. [It is worth noting that the Yevamot text states that contraception is generally prohibited for Jews: it only allows it in the case of youths, already pregnant women, and nursing women. It appears Hodge disagrees with contraceptive use in these circumstances, despite the text's express concern only for the health of the mother and her potential child.] Also, no evidence has been presented that mitigates against the view that the Israelites held the above view on the purposes of sexuality. The moral system presented in the Bible was indeed at odds with the pagan nations, but there is no reason to suppose that there was no agreement with them on issues such as the purposes of sex, especially where such purposes are so manifestly obvious.
Hodge continues on to discuss the incest prohibitions in verses 6-18, and then the other sundry prohibitions in verses 19-23. He argues that the incest laws were issued out of concern for birth defects and infant mortality. This may be partly true, but it is a highly speculative suggestion, especially since the text does not state as much, and also because not all of the condemned relationships would plausibly result in such things (see vv. 15-18; none of these relationships necessarily involve marriage among blood relatives). In addition, as Matthew Henry notes in his commentary on this passage, it would be inordinate to unite in a one-flesh union two people who were already "one flesh by nature" (i.e. blood relatives), or who were already in an inherently unequal relationship like that which exists between parents and children, aunts and nieces, etc. It therefore makes more sense to interpret these prohibitions as intended to safeguard the honor and sanctity of marriage as opposed to merely ensure the health of infants.
Interestingly, Henry also notes that prohibiting incestuous relationships allows for what he takes to be one of the intentions of marriage: the "enlargement of friendship and interest." Henry writes:
If every man married his own sister (as they would be apt to do from generation to generation if it were lawful), each family would be a world to itself, and it would be forgotten that we are members one of another. It is certain that this has always been looked upon by the more sober heathen as a most infamous and abominable thing; and those who had not this law yet were herein a law to themselves. [Italics his]If this suggestion is correct, it provides a further principled reason for the moral laws delineated here.
Hodge continues to discuss the prohibition on sex during the period of menstrual impurity (interpreted as the menses itself in addition to the seven days of ritual impurity following it) codified in verse 19. He notes that the punishment for violating the strictures given throughout this chapter is death (i.e. "cutting off"; see v. 29), which apparently indicates that these laws are moral in nature, as opposed to ceremonial or ritual. Hence, the very act of having intercourse with a menstruating woman is itself unholy, immoral, and abominable. Hodge goes on to argue that the menstrual interdiction is likely intended to teach the Israelites a "lesson concerning the right [procreative] use of the sexual act."
This is all very muddled reasoning. To begin with, it is foolish to stratify the ceremonial and ritual laws issued throughout Leviticus (and elsewhere) from moral considerations. Ancient Jews didn't distinguish between moral, civil, and ceremonial laws like Christians do today, and there are plenty of examples in Scripture of the violation of ceremonial strictures resulting in the death of the offender or offenders (see the aforementioned Lev. 10:1-2 and Num. 15:32-35 passages). To put this point in other words, the ceremonial law was only binding on the Jews because it was issued by God, not because of any fundamental or inherent duty to follow it. Compare the act of cleaning one's room: there is no inherent moral obligation to do so, but a child may become obligated to if his parents, a legitimate moral authority, command it. In like manner, the prohibition of sex with a menstruating woman may hold moral force simply because God commanded it. How do we know such action would be immoral even if God hadn't condemned it? This point is particularly important insofar as it may relate to the limited applicability of certain laws. We are not today obligated to observe the sacrificial or dietary systems, where we would be if those systems were motivated by universal moral considerations.
In response to this, one might perhaps point to the closing portion of the chapter, in which God states that the other nations have become "defiled" (טָמֵא) by the "abominations" (תּוֹעֵבָה) just condemned, and for that reason He "brought its punishment upon it, so that the land has spewed out its inhabitants" (vv. 24, 25). If the laws here are chiefly ritual, why are the other nations defiled and "spewed out" by them? Why are the actions condemned as "abominations"? The answer is, as I have noted, that the ceremonial nature of a particular law didn't make any moral difference in the minds of ancient Hebrews. The point of Levitius 18 is to provide legislation regulating sexual behavior, whether that legislation is "ritual" or not. The customs of the surrounding nations were abominable simply because they were not in accord with God's statutes and judgments. Here as always, we must recognize the sovereignty of God in communicating His will to humanity, which will ultimately constitutes the moral standard that we are accountable to.
Finally, it must be added that Hodge's interpretation of verse 19 is mitigated against by Leviticus 20:18, which reads as follows:
This passage clearly indicates that the immorality associated with intercourse during the menses had to do with the fact of blood flow (and the ritual uncleanliness connected with it). To the ancient Hebrews, blood was considered sacred. It was used to atone for sins (Lev. 4), and it was forbidden to consume it (Gen. 9:2-4, Lev. 17:11). Given these facts, it makes perfect sense that sexual intercourse would be forbidden by God where such intercourse "uncovers" the menstrual blood. There are no grounds for asserting that this prohibition was issued even partly to restrain the wrongful use of the sexual act.If a man lies with a woman during her sickness and uncovers her nakedness, he has exposed her flow, and she has uncovered the flow of her blood. Both of them shall be cut off from their people.
We now continue to verse 20, which condemns adultery. Hodge argues that the actual meaning of the text in Hebrew is "you are not to give your semen to plant seed/offspring into your neighbor's wife, to be defiled with her." He contends that the emphasis of the text is on the child, not on the covetous aspect of adultery. Now, I am no expert in Hebrew, but I cannot discern any reason for the translation Hodge comes up with above. There is no word in the verse which corresponds to the term "offspring" or "child." The phrase Hodge wants to translate as "give your semen to plant seed/offspring" contains two Hebrew words: זֶרַע and שְׁכֹבֶת. The latter occurs only four times in the Bible, and designates a "lying of copulation" (cf. v. 23). The former literally means seed, and by extension may refer to semen, offspring, the agricultural sowing time, or even moral qualities (e.g. Jer. 2:29, Isa. 57:4). In this context, the combination of the two words indicates sexual intercourse; a direct translation would be something along the lines of a "lying of semen." Similar constructions appear in Lev. 15:18 and 19:20, with both passages containing the exact same description of a "lying" (שָׁכַב; this has a broader meaning than שְׁכֹבֶת) of seed (זֶרַע) of "copulation" (שְׁכָבָה; this also just refers to the general act of lying down). It is rather obvious that the latter two texts are not making reference to childbearing at all, so this coupled with the grammatical inconsistency of Hodge's preferred translation essentially rules out the natal construction. Furthermore, Hodge's translation is out of place here and would fail to condemn adulterous intercourse universally (i.e., adultery which did not result in a child would not fall under the prohibition). The point of the verse is that it is immoral to engage in a "lying of semen," or sexual intercourse, with the wife of one's neighbor. Let the reader peruse the interlinear analysis here; it should be clear that the stress of the text is not on any potential offspring, but rather on the immorality of adultery and the uncleanness that results from it. Hodge goes on about how the death penalty for adultery historically included the child along with the offending parties, and that this obviously destroys any possibility for the child to be "brought up to the Lord" within the Israelite community. Of course, the destruction of any child that may have been conceived by the transgressors was truly one of the maleffects of adulterous behavior, but it will not do for Hodge to glibly state that adultery was considered an act of sexual immorality "in that it threaten[ed] the opportunity for God to create a child for the purpose of being raised up to Him." That is question-begging. As I have been showing throughout this treatise, action that inhibits God's natural "opportunity" for creating a child is not ever condemned by Scripture. Hence, we have no grounds for insisting that the prohibition of verse 20 was in any way some sort of interdiction on contraceptive activity (although it is more than likely that the danger of harm coming to the child as a result of the adultery was factored into it).
Next, we move to verse 21, which commands that the Israelites are not to perform child sacrifices to the Canaanite god Moloch, and equates doing so with sexual immorality, as per the theme of the entire chapter. Hodge wants to argue that the connection of child sacrifice with sexual immorality is another example of the "misuse" of the sexual act. He quotes Hartley in his World Biblical Commentary on Leviticus, where Hartley notes the greater weight placed on this prohibition than the preceding ones, due to the statement "nor shall you profane the name of your God; I am the Lord." He also quotes Augustine in stating that the purpose of procreation is not merely the creation of a child but also the development and nurture of the child in the community he is born into. I am inclined to accept both of these insights; there is, in fact, a greater seriousness attached to the abomination of child sacrifice than to the other abominations condemned in this chapter, and it is quite true that those who choose to have children are under a moral obligation to care for them and "bring them up in the Lord" instead of using them as mere means to the end of one's own personal wealth or good fortune (as Moloch worshippers intended by their human sacrifices). However, it cannot be concluded from these facts that the immorality of sacrifice to Moloch boils down to "misusing" the sexual act, the exclusive purpose of which is to have and raise godly children. The obvious import of the prohibition here is that producing a child through the sexual act only to pass that child through the fire is extremely wicked and that it profanes the name of God. Leviticus 20:1-5 supplies insight into why child sacrifices constitute sexual immorality in particular: they involve "playing the harlot" after Moloch. Notice that in the circumstance in question, conception is not inhibited at all. The interdiction concerns how the child is treated following his creation, not his creation as such. Therefore, there can be no argument to the effect that sacrificing one's children to Moloch is evil because it hinders God's sexual purposes for the human race. The situation here effectively involves abortion, not contraception.
Hodge continues on to discuss the following two verses, which condemn homosexuality and bestiality, respectively. He argues as he has been throughout this entire part of his book, that the actions of homosexuality and bestiality are immoral because conception is impossible on them. I answer in turn as I have been arguing throughout this entire treatise, that we may not assume that these actions are condemned because they are unproductive, but rather because they are distortions of God's will regarding how human beings ought to conduct themselves sexually. God's plan for sexuality is that it occurs only between a man and a woman united in marriage. This much is clear from Scripture, and I maintain that we cannot go beyond this in our speculations regarding God's rationale for prohibiting things like homosexuality or bestiality.
Hodge also goes on about how all of the injunctions contained in Leviticus 18 threaten God's opportunity to create children for His community. He insists that the primary reason God created the human couple is for procreation and that each element of the chapter is condemned precisely because it threatens God's procreative opportunities. It should be clear to the reader at this point why these contentions amount to striving after wind. There is continual assumption and extrapolation on Hodge's part from what the Scriptures do say to what they do not: from his conjecture that the "one flesh" of Genesis 2 means a child to his interpretation of Onan's sin to his reasoning as to why bestiality is wrong, Hodge's entire paradigmatic approach to the Scriptures involves torturing the evil of contraceptive action from statements which, when rightly approached, can yield no such determinations. With this resolution, I will conclude this section of my refutation concerning the Old Testament and move on to the New.
NEW TESTAMENT
At long last, we proceed to material that is more directly relevant to the life of the Christian. As with the previous section of this refutation, I will review the points that Hodge seeks to make about the sexual ethic promulgated by the New Testament, and respond to each of them.
We begin with a review of the term πορνεία, which is used in the Bible to refer to sexual immorality. Hodge goes on about the niceties of how the term is applied in the New Testament sense, and how its meaning shifted from the Old Testament era to the Second Temple Period to the time of Jesus and following. He cites various apocryphal texts in their usage of the word πορνεία and briefly discusses the usage of the term in Biblical passages such as Acts 15:20-29, 1 Timothy 1:8-10, and 1 Corinthians. There is little that I wish to contest on the semantics of the term "sexual immorality," and there is little that is important for our present discussion here (although I will note the baseless assertion on p. 83 with respect to Jude v. 8: there is no reason to believe that the phrase "defile the flesh" is a reference to masturbation or coitus interruptus). I will therefore move on to review Hodge's interpretation of the sin list included in the 1 Timothy 1 passage, and then on to his more concrete Biblical arguments.
First Timothy 1:8-10 reads as follows:
8 But we know that the Law is good, if one uses it lawfully, 9 realizing the fact that law is not made for a righteous person, but for those who are lawless and rebellious, for the ungodly and sinners, for the unholy and profane, for those who kill their fathers or mothers, for murderers 10 and immoral men and homosexuals and kidnappers and liars and perjurers, and whatever else is contrary to sound teaching.I have added bold text to illustrate the structure of the sin list, which mostly sets up each vice as part of a doublet. Hodge notices as much, and he points out the parallel in verse 10, which refers to "immoral men (πόρνος) and homosexuals (ἀρσενοκοίτης)." He argues that the term ἀρσενοκοίτης is made up of the words for "male" and "the ejaculation of semen," and that Paul generally uses the latter word (κοίτη) when speaking of semen. All of this is incorrect; the word ἀρσενοκοίτης is actually made up of the words for "male" and "bed." [Alternatively, the latter part of ἀρσενοκοίτης may consist of the o-grade stem of κεῖμαι, "to lie," and the masculine agentive suffix "-της."] While κοίτη can by implication indicate sexual intercourse, conception, and semen (see Thayer's lexicon entry), the primary meaning of the word is simply a place for lying down to sleep. Paul only uses the word twice in Scripture (Romans 9:10 and 13:13; also Hebrews 13:4 if it is granted that Paul wrote this epistle), in mentioning Rebekah's conception of twins by Isaac and sexual promiscuity/fornication. In Hebrews 13:4, the word is used to specify the marriage bed. In none of these instances is semen the primary referent, and there are no grounds for the assertion that it is the chief nomen significans for the act of ejaculation in the Pauline lexicon. Because of this, it cannot be argued that the emphasis of this term for homosexuality is on the misuse or "waste" of semen. Furthermore, it is questionable to argue directly from the etymology of a word to its intended meaning in any particular case. Despite the fact that the uses of ἀρσενοκοίτης by Paul in the relevant Scriptural texts constitute the first uses of the word in recorded history, one cannot glibly conclude from this that Paul "created" the word himself from the Septuagint version of Leviticus 18:22, as plausible a suggestion as that may be.
Finally, we make our way to an interesting passage that has, as Hodge notes, a "long history of scrutiny" from plenty of scholars, much of which has been devoted to the question of homosexuality: Romans 1:18-32. Hodge embarks on a brief exegesis of the actual passage's surrounding context before delving into his anti-contraceptive argument on the basis of verses 26-27. The section in question is somewhat lengthy, but in the interests of providing the reader with important background material, I will reproduce it here in its entirety:
18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who suppress the truth in unrighteousness, 19 because what may be known of God is manifest in them, for God has shown it to them. 20 For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse, 21 because, although they knew God, they did not glorify Him as God, nor were thankful, but became futile in their thoughts, and their foolish hearts were darkened. 22 Professing to be wise, they became fools, 23 and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like corruptible man—and birds and four-footed animals and creeping things.24 Therefore God also gave them up to uncleanness, in the lusts of their hearts, to dishonor their bodies among themselves, 25 who exchanged the truth of God for the lie, and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen.26 For this reason God gave them up to vile passions. For even their women exchanged the natural use for what is against nature. 27 Likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust for one another, men with men committing what is shameful, and receiving in themselves the penalty of their error which was due.28 And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a debased mind, to do those things which are not fitting; 29 being filled with all unrighteousness, sexual immorality, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, strife, deceit, evil-mindedness; they are whisperers, 30 backbiters, haters of God, violent, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, 31 undiscerning, untrustworthy, unloving, unforgiving, unmerciful; 32 who, knowing the righteous judgment of God, that those who practice such things are deserving of death, not only do the same but also approve of those who practice them.
The first paragraph informs us of several things: that the wrath of God is being revealed now (as opposed to being revealed at some point in the eschatological future), that this wrath is being revealed against a particular group of people (i.e. there should not be a comma in the middle of v. 18), and that this group of people has debased themselves by embracing foolishness, unbelief, futility, and idolatry. The second paragraph continues on to state that because of the idolatry and foolishness of these people, God saw fit to "give them up" (παραδίδωμι) to "uncleanness" (ἀκαθαρσία), that they might dishonor their bodies among themselves. In the third paragraph, exactly what God has given these people up into is specified: "vile passions" (ἀτιμίας πάθη) that forsake the "natural use" (φυσικὴν χρῆσιν) of the opposite sex for what is "against nature" (φύσιν παρὰ). Finally, the last paragraph repeats the idea of God giving the offenders over to their sin and issues a list of vices for which they are culpable; indeed, "filled" with (πεπληρωμένους).
Hodge wants to argue on the basis of Paul's use of the word ἀτιμία in Romans 9:21 and 2 Timothy 2:20 that the phrase "ἀτιμίας πάθη" in verse 26 is being used in contrast to something made to fulfill a "special purpose" for God. He asserts that these verses set up a dichotomy between those whom God "chooses to fulfill the purpose for which He made them...versus those He designates as atimia, 'dishonorable'," and on the basis of this contends that the passions condemned in Romans 1 are designated as ἀτιμίας because they are not used in a way set apart for God's intended purposes. Now, it is true that the Pauline pottery metaphor at play in the aforementioned verses does set up a contrast between those who are made for honor and those made for dishonor, but they don't carry the import Hodge associates with them. To see what is wrong with his interpretation, consider what the texts in question actually state. Romans 9, in treating of God's sovereignty and justice, claims that God creates different individuals for different purposes (interestingly, even those "lumps of clay" created for dishonorable use are said to fulfill God's purposes). In comparison, 2 Timothy 2 speaks of human responsibility in cleansing oneself of sin and thereby becoming a "vessel of honor." It is clear from both of these texts that what is set apart for God's uses and purposes is indeed honorable in a sense, but it would be affirming the consequent to conclude from this that what is honorable just is what is set apart for God's uses and purposes. Hodge's reasoning is thus fallacious.
We now proceed to the actual anti-contraception argument. Hodge makes two claims here: that Romans 1 plausibly condemns contraception directly, and that it condemns contraception indirectly as well. I will consider both of these claims in turn.
The argument for direct condemnation begins by noting that the pronoun "their" used in the text is in the masculine gender. Hodge insists that this may indicate that the principal referents throughout the passage are men and that the women spoken of in the passage are the wives of these men. He suggests that what is really meant by verses 26-27 is that the wives of these men engage in "unproductive" sexual activity with them, while the men themselves additionally engage in homosexuality. The idea is that a merism is set up by vv. 26-27, in which all non-procreative sex acts are denounced as against the will of God: all forms of sexual immorality are covered by means of the contrast between illicit heterosexual acts and homosexual acts.
This is a highly dubious argument, in virtue of the fact that masculine pronouns are often used in Scripture as default terms which may refer to both males and females (see Mat. 5:3ff, Mat. 21:41, Mat. 25:32, 44, 45, Luk. 11:4, 2 Pe. 2:1, Rom. 15:14, etc.). Hodge attempts to fortify his reading by suggesting that the word "αὐτῶν" in "their women" refers back to the word "αὐτός," which itself refers to those who have been given over to vile passions. However, it remains the most likely case that the group of people condemned by Paul in this passage include males and females and that both uses of αὐτός are masculine only in form. This can be seen particularly from Paul's use of ἀνθρώπων in verse 18; it is obviously implausible to suppose that God's wrath is only revealed against men who suppress the truth in unrighteousness, not women who do the same (cf. the use of ἄνθρωπος in Mat. 4:4, 19, 5:16, 10:33, and 15:11). In addition, the application of the word ὁμοίως in v. 27 shows that the "unnatural" sins of the men and women are one and the same; insofar as v. 27 clarifies that this sin is homosexuality, it must be the case that both the men and the women are engaging in homosexual behavior.
Despite his insistence on its plausibility, Hodge himself admits the dubiousness of this argument and moves on to make his argument for indirect condemnation. His basis for this is Paul's use of the word χρῆσις ("function" or "use") in verses 26 and 27. To his credit, Hodge does not attempt to make any sort of argument from "natural law" here. He rightly recognizes that Biblical morality is based on ordo creatus naturalis as opposed to lex naturalis, and that Paul is not trying to employ some sort of Stoic virtue ethic in making his points against homosexuality. However, he wrongly concludes from Paul's use of the phrase "φυσικὴν χρῆσιν" that we are being told there is a natural use of the sexual act that is not being fulfilled in homosexual intercourse. If this is the case, it becomes clear that contraception must be condemned here because the only natural function of sex that cannot be fulfilled by homosexuality is procreation (i.e., pleasure and intimacy may both be features of homosexual activity). While this latter point is true, we must pay close attention to the text: verse 26 merely states that the women have abandoned a natural use without explaining what that natural use is. In verse 27, it is made clear that this natural use is of the opposite sex, NOT the sexual act itself. With this insight in mind, we can clearly understand Paul's argument: homosexuality is wrong because it involves forsaking God's will as manifested in creation, particularly in the very way that God created humanity itself, and in the ways He wants humans to relate to each other sexually and maritally. Hodge notes that Paul makes likely allusions to the LXX text of Genesis 1 in his use of the word θῆλυς ("female") instead of γυνή ("woman") and ἄρρην ("male") instead of ἀνήρ ("man"). But these allusions are not to the creation mandate of Genesis 1:28, but rather to the creation itself in the antecedent verse. It is because of God's will and purposes in creating mankind as male and female that homosexuality is immoral, not His will and purposes with respect to the sexual act (let the reader understand that I am not arguing there is no "incorrect" way to use the sexual act at all, only that Romans 1 is concerned less with the act itself and more with the proper, God-willed relationship that ought to exist exclusively between men and women).
Hodge also suggests that Paul is alluding to Leviticus 18 in verse 32 because the actions of those he condemns are worthy of death (the same penalty prescribed in Leviticus 18), and also because Paul notes that the Gentiles know "by nature" the ordinances of God. This is a doubtful notion, for the same reasons given above regarding the relationship between the respective sins of Er and Onan. It must be kept in mind that all sin is worthy of death, not just sins against a particular piece of God's law (Rom. 6:23).
This is indeed a difficult passage and one which has undoubtedly given pause to many theologians over the years. I do not claim to have shed light on every facet of it, or expounded all there is to know here, but I hope I have at least convincingly shown the reader that Romans 1 gives the advocate of contraception little reason for concern.
We shall now address the penultimate Biblical argument given by Hodge against contraception: potion makers in the New Testament. The idea here is that a condemnation of contraception is implicit in the Scriptural interdictions against "φαρμακεία," a word often translated as "sorcery," but which chiefly refers to the production of herbal medicines. In ancient times, potion makers (φάρμακος) were the principal suppliers of drugs and typically knew spells and magical charms to affect the health of patients as well. Hodge's argument is basically that the potions in question were likely contraceptives because medicine in general wouldn't have been adjudged as immoral by early Christians (he quotes Ecclesiasticus 38:1-15 in support of this), and because prohibitions against idolatry in the New Testament already addressed the occultic use of magic and ritual, so the emphasis is on the drugs themselves as opposed to their spiritual use.
He also cites the usage of these terms in Revelation, a text which uses marriage as a metaphor for the relationship between Christ and the Church. In keeping with this metaphor, Revelation often uses the imagery of sexual conduct to convey the unfaithfulness and error of the false church (eg. 2:21-21, 3:4 (cf. 14:4); also 14:8, 17:2, 18:3, and 19:2, where the false church is referred to as Babylon). It is noted that each time Babylon is condemned for her "fornication," the text states that all of the nations participate in it in some way (see 14:8, 17:2, 18:3, and 19:2). However, in 18:23 Babylon is condemned for her φαρμακείᾳ, and in 21:8 and 22:15 the sins of sexual immorality and φαρμακεία appear together. According to Hodge, this indicates that the two concepts are closely related and that the drugs in question have something to do with sexual immorality. Finally, it is noted how Old Testament imagery tends to equate fornication and sorcery, or at least treat them as very closely related (e.g. Nahum 3:1-4, Isaiah 57:3, 2 Kings 9:22, Malachi 3:5, cf. Didache 2.2). This also allegedly suggests that φαρμακεία in the New Testament is a reference to "distorted sexual practices" in which potions are consumed to prevent conception.
The weakness of this argument is shocking. Here we have yet another Hodgian extrapolation from meager Scriptural evidence to a "strong" implication against contraception. To begin with, if a case is to be made against contraception here, it will not do to merely argue that the use of potions is condemned by Scripture because it is a contraceptive and/or abortifacient practice. If Hodge wants to argue against contraception, he needs to prove that φαρμακεία is immoral particularly because it is contraceptive. On the evidence he provides, it is quite possible that potions are condemned merely because of their abortifacient properties. Also, the idea that the very drugs themselves are what is at issue as opposed to their occultic use is complete nonsense; that general New Testament prohibitions of idolatry "cover" the practice of herbal witchcraft hardly means that the New Testament authors can't condemn herbal witchcraft specifically. This would be akin to arguing that homosexuality can't be what Paul means in his use of the term ἀρσενοκοίτης because homosexuality is "covered" in more general Scriptural words for sin or sexual immorality. It is additionally questionable to appeal to a work of dubious authenticity as canonical Scripture to demonstrate that pharmaceutical practice in general would not have been condemned by the primitive church. While it is true that Ecclesiasticus was used as another piece of Old Testament wisdom literature by some, it is far from certain that its laudation of physicians and medicine would have been considered decisive in any respect.
Furthermore, while it is true that the Biblical imagery surrounding the use of potions does connect that practice with certain others like sexual immorality and idolatry, it does not follow from this that they are the exact same thing. They are connected in Scripture because they are sins that tend to appear in connection with each other (compare the sin list of 1 Tim. 1; the parallelism of the text illustrates various vices that bear intrinsic relation with certain others). The fact that the author of Revelation tends to interchange and place in close proximity the words for fornication and sorcery hardly proves that they are logically equivalent (see Thayer's lexicon entry for φαρμακεία, linked above). That there is an intrinsic connection between φαρμακεία and sorcery is demonstrated from its use in the Septuagint in Exodus 7:11, 7:22, and 8:18.
All in all, it is quite impossible to conclude from the available evidence that the use of potions is rejected by the New Testament in part or in full because of any contraceptive properties the potions might have had. Hodge's argument fails.
At long last, we proceed to the final consideration that allegedly inveighs against contraceptive practice. The text in question is 1 Timothy, a personal epistle written to a minister active at the church in Ephesus. The epistle addresses certain false teachings that arose within the Ephesian church, and issues guidance to Timothy regarding proper doctrine and courses of action he ought to take in pastoring the congregation. Hodge first draws our attention to verse 2:15, which reads as follows:
But women will be preserved through the bearing of children if they continue in faith and love and sanctity with self-restraint.This statement follows a brief discussion by Paul of the proper conduct women ought to pursue in the church (vv. 9-14). In verses 13-14 allusions to Genesis are made to the effect that Adam was created before Eve, and that it was Eve who was deceived into committing sin (as opposed to Adam). Hodge interprets verse 15 as a counter to Ephesian culture, where women were allegedly encouraged to have only a single male heir. He supposes that it is through childbearing that women are "restored" to the "intended prelapsarian, godly role" that God instituted for women. Perhaps Hodge thinks that contraception in any form whatsoever mitigates against God's will for how women ought to live as "new creations" (2 Cor. 5:17), who in having children are participating in the proper order of the world. Woman's glorification of God is principally through childbearing, according to him, and one of the primary elements of her salvation is through her said "restoration" to motherhood. It is inferred from this that conception shouldn't be hindered.
Now, we must first raise the obvious issue of how the salvation of women relates to the good work of childbearing in light of verse 15. It should be obvious to most that Paul is not saying any good work is necessary to merit salvation; this would contradict his message of justification through faith (cf. Eph. 2:8-9, Romans 3 passim). But is there any way to construct an argument against contraception from this text that does not imply synergism? It appears that Hodge's preferred method of approach is to draw from Paul's statement here a normative declaration of the proper female life: women are "saved" through childbearing insofar as they participate in what God originally created women for (let the reader recall that Hodge believes human gender distinctions exist solely because of procreation). The issue is, this interpretation does not follow from what Paul is saying.
Let us take a look at the passage in context. Verses 9-15 read as follows:
9 Likewise, I want women to adorn themselves with proper clothing, modestly and discreetly, not with braided hair and gold or pearls or costly garments, 10 but rather by means of good works, as is proper for women making a claim to godliness. 11 A woman must quietly receive instruction with entire submissiveness. 12 But I do not allow a woman to teach or exercise authority over a man, but to remain quiet. 13 For it was Adam who was first created, and then Eve. 14 And it was not Adam who was deceived, but the woman being deceived, fell into transgression. 15 But women will be preserved through the bearing of children if they continue in faith and love and sanctity with self-restraint.The background of v. 15 is a brief exhortation regarding how women ought to behave and conduct themselves in the church. This section immediately follows the instruction given to men in v. 8. It seems clear from these antecedent verses, coupled with the understanding that Paul is addressing false teaching present in Ephesus, that his emphasis is on the proper role and attitudes of women. It appears that he finds childbearing to be a useful example of this role given that it is something particularly appropriate for (and exclusive to) women. This would make sense especially given the Ephesian false teachers' derision of marriage (4:3). Furthermore, the statement in verse 15 is not an unqualified description of the situation all women are in. The word "women" in that verse is not actually present in the Greek; English translations typically use "she" to follow the 3rd-person singular passive indicative inflection Paul employs there. Therefore, the women who are "saved" (σῴζω) through childbearing are particularly those who have been deceived into transgression, not all women. If true, this would undercut the normative force Hodge wants to assign this passage. It is certainly the case that when women bear children they are participating in a role which God did ordain for women specifically, a role which is indeed "prelapsarian" and godly. But it does not follow from this that the role in question is normative or obligatory for women to pursue. The same reasoning applies to the role of father, husband, and wife. While it can be said that God created men and women "for" these vocations, it cannot be said that if one fails to take his or her place in one of them, he acts against God's will.
So if Paul isn't saying what Hodge takes him to be, what is he saying? In my view, the most plausible alternative is that v. 15 is not discussing justification at all, but rather preservation through the ordeal of giving birth. The use of "σῴζω" would therefore not indicate salvation from sin, but rather the bringing of women safely through their pregnancies. This reading is what the above NASB translation follows. But how likely is this reading as opposed to the "salvation through childbearing" one that Hodge prefers? While it is true that σῴζω is one of Paul's normal words for salvation, it is important to keep in mind that the meaning of the term is not technical. It simply means "to save," and can take on a more general import with respect to safety or healing (cf. Mat. 9:22, Mk. 5:34, Luk. 7:50, Jms. 5:15, Mat. 8:25, Mk. 13:20, Jn. 12:27, etc.; see Rom. 5:9-10 for a Pauline juxtaposition between justification and general rescue). This is in keeping with the allusions to Genesis 3, and particularly 3:16 where God curses childbearing to be painful and difficult. The point is that despite the hardship inherent to giving birth, God will preserve women through it provided they persevere in "faith and love and sanctity, with self-restraint." I favor this interpretation of verse 15, but even if the phrase "saved through childbearing" does refer to salvation, it cannot be inferred from this that contraception is immoral, or that conception shouldn't be hindered at all.
One final additional consideration is the possibility of Paul's using childbearing as a model good work by which women are justified indirectly. To see this, it will be instructive to compare this passage to James 2:14-26. While that text may at first glance imply that justification is a matter of faith and works, a careful reading will show that there is no incompatibility between it and Rom. 3:21-28 at all. The point of the former is simply that belief alone, stratified from any sort of new obedience or change in one's lifestyle and attitude, cannot be considered true faith. James uses this insight to argue that we are "justified by works," and not by "faith" alone. This passage has been employed to destructive effect by proponents of synergism due to the language it uses, but the reader will see that it makes much sense if one approaches it with the understanding that works can be said to justify indirectly, insofar as they "perfect" one's faith, confirming it and proving it to be genuine. In like manner, women may be said to be justified by childbearing indirectly, insofar as by performing that particular good work which is especially suited to them, they act out of trust and faith toward God, perfecting their belief in Him. It must be stressed here that the example of childbearing is just that, an example. The point Paul is trying to make would apply just as well to women who are single, infertile, or otherwise incapable of having children (as per Jms. 2). The central idea he is getting at is merely adapted to the situation at play in the Ephesian congregation, and in the culture that the congregation found itself in.
In any case, the reader may now see the spuriousness of Hodge's claims with respect to the normativity of childbearing in the lives of women. Next, he points to 1 Timothy 5:9-10, a portion of a section concerned with qualifications widows would need to meet in order to receive support from Timothy's congregation. Here is the passage:
9 Do not let a widow under sixty years old be taken into the number, and not unless she has been the wife of one man, 10 well reported for good works: if she has brought up children, if she has lodged strangers, if she has washed the saints’ feet, if she has relieved the afflicted, if she has diligently followed every good work.Among the prerequisites listed are: being at least sixty years of age, having been the wife of one man, and having a reputation for good works. Upon listing the latter requirement, Paul goes into more detail on what good works would be particularly applicable to a widowed woman (keep in mind that he is writing pastoral instruction to a young minister here): successfully bringing up children, exercising hospitality, and assisting the troubled. Hodge notes that this specified list of good deeds is "sandwiched" in-between more the more general idea of being actively virtuous.
He makes much out of Paul's requiring widows to have brought up children in order to be placed on the church's register for financial support. It is asserted that Paul places the "highest of importance" on childrearing here, which serves as a "major indicator" of a woman's relationship with God. He remarks that the works commended consist of giving and preserving life, and that this is what good works primarily are in the Bible. He goes on to conclude from this that the Apostle places the procreative sexual act as of primary importance to a woman's claim to godliness.
These claims are, of course, sheer nonsense. The passage treats of pragmatic and ethical considerations regarding the care of widows. It is clear that Paul is concerned not to implicate the church in the support of such if it is not practically necessary (see vv. 4, 16), nor if the individuals to be supported are immoral or wanton. The instructions given are relatively advanced, and it is likely that Paul's concerns arose as a result of abuses of the widow register that had been taking place in the Ephesian congregation. Such abuses seem to have involved threats to the reputation of the church (vv. 11-15) as well as financial strain. It appears that Paul's directions to Timothy are given in an effort to ameliorate these problems. With this setting in mind, we can see that Paul is not placing the "highest of importance" on childrearing, nor is he treating procreation as some objective standard of morality that women must be measured against. The virtues he treats of in verse 10 all fall within the typical first-century woman's sphere of activity: to be hospitable, humble, and an effective parent were all marks of an ideal woman in the ancient Jewish and Greco-Roman world, and it is no surprise that Paul makes reference to this standard of ideality given his concern for the church's reputation. Provided these facts, it should be obvious that Paul is citing the good works he does because they are visible indications of the widow's character. Widows who hadn't brought up children were not excluded from the register because they were suspected of the "crime" of contraception, but rather because their integrity and reputation could not be confirmed to the rigorous degree Paul deems necessary without successfully raised children serving as witnesses in their favor. [Cf. Paul's idea of feminine virtue with the ideal wife in Prov. 31; the differences in both of these concepts of feminine ideality illustrate the importance of culture in effecting the socially normative gender roles in force at the different times and places in which King Lemuel and Paul wrote.]
The notion that good works in Scripture chiefly consist of giving or preserving life is similarly false. Goodness in the Bible actually consists primarily of obedience and reverence to God and His will (Mat. 22:36-40, Deut. 6:1-9, Prov. 1:7). Even the "second greatest" commandment doesn't necessarily consist in the preservation of life, but rather in willing what is good for others.
Hodge makes a final claim that while the 1 Timothy passages he appeals to deal with very specific ethical concerns, they must be approached as universally normative because the New Testament deals with morality absolutely, not just specifically. I find this very confused reasoning. The fact of the matter is that the New Testament deals with moral considerations both absolutely and specifically. There are cases where general moral principles are applied to reach specific conclusions, but it would be a mistake to infer that because something is wrong in a particular context that it must be wrong in all contexts (Genesis 39 being an excellent example of this). It is fallacious to infer the general from the specific. I have been arguing that even in the above Pauline texts, there is no reason to conclude that contraceptive practice is immoral at all. Depite the very true fact that contraception can be employed in a manner against the will of God (e.g. if Noah had refused to obey God's Genesis 9:1 command), there is little reason to suppose that using it in general circumstances constitutes such action whatsoever.
It has been a long time coming, but we have finally come to the end of our journey through Scripture according to Hodge. So much more relevant material could be brought up to address the issue of contraception, but I will, in the interest of keeping this refutation on track, refrain from considering this material here. I hope my reader is assured of the essential falsehood of all of the arguments brought up against contraception here. While my case has been largely refutatory in adressing arguments against contraception from the Bible, it may be positively contended that if contraception truly was against the will of God, He would have ensured that a Biblical argument against contraception could be successfully made. The fact that such an argument cannot be made is, in my view, a powerful consideration in favor of contraceptive practice. But these are issues to address at a later time; I rest my case with what has been said already.
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