We now arrive at Bryan Hodge's third argument against the morality of contraception: one supposedly drawn from systematic theology. One might wonder how this argument is meant to differ from the Scriptural one we have already observed the failure of given that Hodge's systematic theology is drawn entirely from the Bible. It appears that this particular rhetorical strategy is meant to draw together multiple strands of Biblical teaching as opposed to focusing on the implications of specific passages alone. In any case, it remains my view here as before that Hodge completely fails to defend the notion that it is strictly immoral to avoid childbearing in any capacity. I will review the texts and arguments he employs and show that nothing here may present any significant challenge to the proponent of contraception.
We begin with a discussion of worldview. As the reader may remember from the first part of this refutation, Hodge is under the impression that the only acceptable position for the Christian who is consistent in his worldview is an unqualified rejection of contraception in all forms. He thinks that any different approach to the issue must involve the contamination of the Christian worldview by anti-Christian influences. Hodge supposes that the typical Christian proponent of contraception will arrive at his views by means of two propositions which Hodge states thusly:
1. I believe God gives us a generic ability to have children at creation and/or then blesses our choices whether to have them thereafter.
2. I therefore believe it is the responsibility of each person to decide for him or herself how many children they [sic] will have.
Hodge complains that these propositions assume a non-Christian view of God's relationship to the world, one that presupposes naturalism in denying God's "creative interaction" with it. According to the view Hodge has in mind, God simply sets up the world and its functions and then steps away, as it were, to a role restricted to sustaining the abilities of His creation. Supposedly this philosophy pervades the modern evangelical's view of the natural world and prevents him from approaching it as something used by God. Hodge continues to critique the naturalistic view that all events are scientifically explicable and therefore not supernatural, that natural biological processes created children on their own without God's "making any decision about it," and that God is passive in the creation of life. For the sake of brevity, I will not recount every point he makes on this topic, because the entire discussion has thus far begged a very important question: that the Christian must assume naturalism in arguing for the acceptability of contraception.
Consider the first above proposition. Is it true that God gives us the power to conceive children? Clearly! But need we assume that God is "absent" from the event of conception to believe this? Absolutely not! Here is the actual state of things. As per the classical, mainstream Christian view of God, the world was created and is at all times completely dependent on His sustaining action in order to exist even at any moment in time. Everything may only exist because of God's activity in keeping it in being; things possess the natures or "essences" that they do only because of such divine activity. The world is more likened to the music produced by a pianist than a painting produced by an artist: the painting is not dependent on the artist's activity once it has been painted, but the music necessarily stops when the pianist stops playing. Thus is the situation with God and the world. And not only does God constantly act in sustaining the world in being, but things are only directed to the ends that they are in virtue of God's activity in directing them thusly. For example, God may act to sustain in being a particular chunk of copper. But it is also the case that it is in the nature of copper to exhibit malleability, ductility, conductivity, a face-centered cubic crystal lattice, etc. Copper may behave in the manner characteristic of it only because of God's power in directing it in that way, and this is another important aspect of God's relationship to the world. Now, all of this may feel very tangential to the present discourse, and a proper defense of the metaphysical claims here would need to be done elsewhere (a useful introduction to the traditional view just presented can be found in Edward Feser's book Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide). However, the reader shall see that this correct understanding of how God acts in the world will be helpful in isolating the errors in Hodge's reasoning.
In particular, it should be evident at this point that we need not presuppose naturalism in supposing that conception isn't immoral. God has given us our natural faculties, and He has willed that they be present in us for a certain natural purpose, namely procreation. In addition, God wills that when the sexual situation obtains that sperm and eggs are in the close physical vicinity of each other, the sperm will tend to penetrate the egg and initiate the process of embryonic formation. It is only with respect to this particular situation obtaining that God specifically acts to create a human person within the womb. There is no conscious decision or intention on God's part to create a child unless this circumstance obtains. To borrow the terminology of Richard Swinburne, sperm and eggs have the power to form an embryo, and the liability to do so when there is physical contact between them. There is simply no action or will of God relative to creating a new life in lieu of this scenario. That is, the most we can say about God's will relative to the act of conception is that He desires the natural state of affairs to be such that when sexual intercourse is performed so that sperm make it into physical proximity with eggs, an embryo will tend to form and God's creative activity will manifest as per Psalm 139:13-16.
Hodge does embark on a brief analysis of Psalm 139 as well as Job 10:8-11, but nothing especially relevant to the points I have just made is expounded upon. He does make a few errors that I think are important to dispel, however. First, it is noted with respect to the former text that God creates the "inward parts" (metaphorical for the mind or "seat of moral thought," as Hodge puts it) through the act of conception, and that God "creates personhood in the very act of conception." But this doesn't exactly follow from the text; indeed, the act of conception is never referenced at all. The phrase translated as "skillfully wrought" literally means variegated (cf. Ex. 27:16, 28:39, 35:35, 38:23, etc.); God's creation of David involved His working with colors on account of the different coloring of the various organs and physical components. The point is simply that it is God who was ultimately responsible for interweaving David together in his mother's womb, which is referred to metaphorically as a "secret" (alternatively, "covering"), and as the "depths of the earth." Second, Hodge wants to approach the "unformed substance" of v. 16 as a "pre-embryonic person that has yet to be put together." He supposes the context, cognate information, and parallel with Job 10 suggests this. Of course, this is nonsense. There is no contextual warrant for judging the referent to be anything other than an embryo, an undeveloped human. The word גֹּלֶם simply refers to an inchoate object or amorphous mass, and furthermore, there is no such thing as a "pre-embryonic person." A sperm and an egg do not constitute a person for the same reason that rocks and corpses do not constitute persons. Namely, if a substance does not possess by nature the qualities essential to human personhood, it cannot be said to be a human person. This reading is supported by the latter part of v. 19; before David's conception, his life had not begun! Even if we were to attempt to make sense of the "formless mass" as referring to pre-embryonic substance, we would need to approach David's identitive claim (viz. "my substance") as idiomatic of that which would become his substance. Either way, the suggestion is implausible. Third, Hodge's conclusions regarding Job 10:10 are questionable. That text concerns Job's lament over his life and struggles, in which he cries out to God: "Did You not pour me out like milk, and curdle me like cheese?" Given the context of life's beginnings and the simile of pouring milk, it seems likely that Job is referring to seminal emission culminating in the formation (here termed קָפָא, "coagulation") of an embryo. However, the difficulty with this interpretation is that it would seem to equate Job with his father's semen and suggest that God, not Job's father, was the agent active in emitting the semen. Both of these seeming implications are absurd, but I think this issue can be resolved by taking the statement as idiomatic of Job's "virtual" existence as a potential person. But even if we grant that, how could God be said to act in "pouring out" the semen in question? It seems that God is said to act such that the emission occurred insofar as He foreordained Job's existence and planned for him to come about through the sexual activity of Job's parents (there is also a Biblical sense in which God is said to do Himself what he allows his creations to do; cf. 1 Ch. 10:14). Note that none of this means Job actually existed before his conception, but rather that Job was formally or potentially existent in his father's semen, analogous to the way in which an oak tree is formally or potentially existent in an acorn. A similar formulation to Job 10:10 occurs in Hebrews 7:9-10, which speaks of Levi as being "still in the loins of his father," Abraham, when Melchizedek met the latter man.
Hodge also mentions in a footnote Job 15:34, which reads: "For the company of the godless is barren, and fire consumes the tents of the corrupt." He asserts that the word for "godless" here is used in contexts relating to sexual immorality or taking a life, but the word really just means profane or irreligious. In addition, Hodge wants to translate "barren" as "sterile," implying a sexual dimension to the issue. But of the four places in Scripture where the word גַּלְמוּד is used, only one of them definitively describes the barrenness of the womb (Is. 49:21). The other two uses apart from the one in question both occur in Job and are used figuratively (see 3:7 and 30:3), making it unlikely that sexual sterility is what the author has in mind here. It seems the point is more along the lines of "the multitude of wicked men is harsh/bleak."
In any case, Hodge moves on to construct a propositional argument on the basis of God's prerogative and will to do whatever He desires (Job 23:13). The syllogism is as follows:
1. God chooses to make every child.
2. No child is made apart from His choice.
3. He never does anything against His moral will.
4. Creating the child is His moral will, since He is the One doing it.
5. Therefore, the person using contraceptive methods, so that the child is not created, is going against God's moral will.
Now, it should be clear enough to the Biblically informed reader that premises 1-4 are patently correct if understood properly. God does indeed have a hand in every child that is in fact created, and none of these creative acts involve God acting against His will. Scripture clearly testifies that all children who are created are gifts from God (Ps. 127:3-5, Ps. 128:3-4). However, the argument fails because the conclusion does not follow from the premises. As discussed above, God's will is not to create a child every time a sexual act takes place. Rather, it is only God's will to create a child when a very specific set of physical circumstances obtain, namely the fertilization of an ovum by a sperm cell and the resulting organism's subsequent implantation onto the uterine wall. If this set of circumstances does not obtain, then a child does not obtain (barring a miraculous conception event, of course). Given this reality, it is senseless to suppose that users of contraception are opposing God's will in preventing children from being conceived. That God wills children to be created when sperms and eggs unite does not mean that He wills them to be created simpliciter. Hodge's argument falsely assumes that the making of a human being through the sexual act just IS "His moral will," but there is absolutely no reason to believe that this statement is unconditionally true. All we are told in Scripture is that God wills the creation of every child who actually does come into being, not those who haven't come into being yet.
In addition, while it is perhaps a rather minute detail, it is worth questioning the language of premise 4 regarding God's "moral will." Hodge distinguishes between God's moral will that all people keep His commandments and His declarative will that takes into account the wicked actions of humans. There is nothing wrong with this distinction, but using it in the case of conception might be taken to suggest that God commands such action of all persons. This is not true, as I have demonstrated in the previous part of this treatise. What is the case is simply that God is doing what He desires to do when He creates children. It is the same situation as when God created the universe; His will to do this was not "moral" at all, it simply involved His desire to undertake a particular course of action.
Hodge attempts to bolster his argument by appealing to God's foreknowledge of future persons as described in texts like Psalm 139:16, Jeremiah 1:5, and Hebrews 7:9-10. He argues that "although we cannot see the future person to be made, and therefore may feel indifferent to that person, God does see and know the person he has not yet made," and that this implies that these persons are "alive before coming into existence." But this is entirely confused reasoning, for the texts in question merely state God's foreknowledge of states of affairs that have not come into being yet. They do not entail the preexistence of persons, or the B-theory of time, or any similar metaphysical nonsense, because the fact of God's possessing knowledge regarding a future entity or event simply does not imply the actual existence of that entity or event. The point of Psalm 139:16 and Jeremiah 1:5 is that God knew who David and Jeremiah were going to be, and the sorts of lives that they would live as His appointed leaders. In like manner, Hebrews 7:9-10 rather obviously does not suggest that Levi literally existed in Abraham's genitals before his own conception; it merely employs a common metaphor to the effect that the sexual act necessary to produce Levi had not yet been performed by the relevant actors This metaphor even persists in our own language today, making it all the more inexcusable for Hodge to press it into service as an argument against contraception. Indeed, if a couple chooses to have no children then there cannot be any "future person" for God to know in the first place! The foreknowledge of God presupposes and takes into account the free actions of human beings.
Next, Hodge tries to argue that God has "reserved" the making and taking of life for Himself, on the basis of passages like 1 Samuel 2:6 and Deuteronomy 32:39. He suggests that we find there the "intent of God to reserve both the giving and the taking of life as His domain," but then realizes they say no such thing and immediately backtracks to insist that we may "partake" in both within the boundaries God has set for us, but it is wrong to attempt control of them beyond those boundaries. I would certainly concur with the latter point, but I would further argue that we have no reason at all to suppose God has placed a boundary on us concerning the prevention of life via contraception. As we have seen, Scripture in no place condemns the use of contraception but is utterly silent on it. Because we cannot speak where God has not spoken, we have no business insisting that people must abstain "from seeking to control the giving of life, specifically by preventing it." Ironically, in twisting the Scriptures to make God speak where He has not, Hodge commits the very same error that he accuses contracepting persons using contraception of; the blasphemous exaltation of the self to godhood.
In addition to this theological argument, Hodge claims that the shame of nakedness associated with the fall as described in Genesis 2 and 3 implies fear of the sexual act, while the shamelessness associated with the prelapsarian state implies fearlessness concerning the same. Supposedly, the lapsarian event is a "subtle hint" that when humans engage in self-worship, they have a "distorted and shameful" view of sex and its purpose. However, I cannot see how one may get this out of the text unless he, like Hodge, already believes that non-procreative uses of sex are inherently immoral. How exactly does Adam and Eve's shame regarding their nudity suggest they were afraid of the sexual act? Does Hodge think Adam and Eve employed contraception? It does not seem that there is any clear connection between these concepts, so Hodge's claim is a non-starter.
These arguments bring us into the final section of this chapter, one in which Hodge makes a last-ditch attempt to connect contraception with a rejection of God's Lordship, and the worship of the self. It is complained that individuals who use contraception do not use it to further the glory and goals of God, but rather to fulfill the individual's desires. Apparently, any person who seeks to prevent children from obtaining via his own use of the sexual act has no one in mind but himself. As Hodge puts it, "God is not Lord of the person's thoughts or decisions." Not only are these incredibly judgmental assertions, they are also extraordinarily categorical! How could anyone know the reasons behind every use of contraception? Why can't preventing conception be done in service and deference to God's will and goals? As the reader may recall from the first part of this refutation, Hodge believes that all activities which do not involve a direct advancement of God's kingdom are evil, and to suppose otherwise is to accept "hedonism." This is completely wrong and is not supported by Scripture whatsoever. Indeed, if anything it is contradicted by Scripture, as indicated in passages like Ps. 104:14-15, Mk. 6:21, and Ecc. 9:7-9 (the Sabbath prohibition on work operative through the Old Testament times also stands in tension with Hodge's view).
But even irrespective of this unbiblical and excessive condemnation of all entertainment, the most damning indictment of this "self-worship" argument is the very fact that God's own word, which is completely sufficient to reveal unto the human race all things necessary for faith and morals (2 Tim. 3:16-17), does not universally condemn the use of contraception. As we know from Scripture, the central metric of our love of God and our acknowledgment of His Lordship is our obedience to His commandments (Jn. 14:15, 21, 23-24; 1 Jn. 2:3-6). It follows directly from this that the place of Christ as Lord of our lives is dependent only on the correspondence between how we are living and the content of His commandments (1 Jn. 3:10). It is precisely because God has sufficiently revealed His will and purposes to us in the Holy Scriptures that we can know contraception is not immoral. If there is no Biblical evidence that a particular practice stands condemned in God's eyes, we simply have no epistemological grounds for supposing that God wills we avoid it, and therefore no moral grounds for condemning it as evil. In this way, we can see that the fundamental issue at play is not whether the individual "controls" his life, but rather how he chooses to live. While it may sound pious to insist that Christians "relinquish control" of their lives, it is not a Biblical idea. What is truly necessary is that Christians use the control over their lives that God has given them to freely submit to God and God's will. It may even be that His will is to meet our desires (Jn. 14:14, cf. Ps. 78:27-29).
Hodge's final theological argument collapses the same way his entire scaffolding of radical natalism does: it rests on his own word, as opposed to that of God.
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